Argued on 2025-01-15.

For petitioners: Derek L. Shaffer, Washington, D. C. For United States, as amicus curiae: Brian H. Fletcher, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. For respondent: Aaron L. Nielson, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.

Question Presented:

This Court has repeatedly held that States may rationally restrict minors' access to sexual materials, but such restrictions must withstand strict scrutiny if they burden adults' access to constitutionally protected speech. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU , 542 U.S. 656, 663 (2004). In the decision below, the Fifth Circuit applied rational-basis review-rather than strict scrutiny-to vacate a preliminary injunction of a provision of a Texas law that significantly burdens adults' access to protected speech, because the law's stated purpose is to protect minors. The question presented is: Whether the court of appeals erred as a matter of law in applying rational-basis review to a law burdening adults' access to protected speech, instead of strict scrutiny as this Court and other circuits have consistently done.

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

• Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

• Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:05) ORAL ARGUMENT OF DEREK L. SHAFFER

(00:48:32) ORAL ARGUMENT OF BRIAN H. FLETCHER

(01:23:17) ORAL ARGUMENT OF AARON L. NIELSON

(02:00:16) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF DEREK L. SHAFFER

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

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• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

• Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Argued on 2025-02-26.

For petitioner: Xiao Wang, Charlottesville, Va.; and Ashley Robertson, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For respondent: T. Elliot Gaiser, Solicitor General, Columbus, Ohio.

Question Presented:

Whether, in addition to pleading the other elements of Title VII, a majority-group plaintiff must show "background circumstances to support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority." App. 5a.

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

• Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

• Merits Stage Brief of the United States (Green Br.)

• Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:06) ORAL ARGUMENT OF XIAO WANG

(00:16:20) ORAL ARGUMENT OF ASHLEY ROBERTSON

(00:31:50) ORAL ARGUMENT OF T. ELLIOT GAISER

(00:53:49) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF XIAO WANG

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• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

• Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Argued on 2025-04-23.

For petitioners: Jeffrey B. Wall, Washington, D. C. For federal respondents: Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. For state respondents: Joshua A. Klein, Deputy Solicitor General, Oakland, Cal.

Question Presented:

Section 209(a) of the Clean Air Act generally preempts States from adopting emission standards for new motor vehicles. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a). But under Section 209(b) of that Act, EPA may grant California and only California-a waiver from federal preemption to set its own vehicle-emission standards. Before granting a preemption waiver, EPA must find that California "need[s]" its own emission standards "to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions." Id. § 7543(b)(1)(B). In 2022, EPA granted California a waiver to set its own standards for greenhouse-gas emissions and to adopt a zero-emission-vehicle mandate, both expressly intended to address global climate change by reducing California vehicles' consumption of liquid fuel. Fuel producers challenged EPA's waiver as contrary to the text of Section 209(b). The D.C. Circuit rejected the challenge without reaching the merits, concluding that fuel producers' injuries were not redressable because they had not established that vacating EP A's waiver would have any effect on automakers. The questions presented are: 1. Whether a party may establish the redressability component of Article III standing by relying on the coercive and predictable effects of regulation on third parties. 2. Whether EPA's preemption waiver for California's greenhouse-gas emission standards and zero-emission- vehicle mandate is unlawful.

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

• Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

• Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:06) ORAL ARGUMENT OF JEFFREY B. WALL

(00:28:25) ORAL ARGUMENT OF EDWIN S. KNEEDLER

(00:46:04) ORAL ARGUMENT OF JOSHUA A. KLEIN

(00:46:06) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF JEFFREY B. WALL

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• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

• Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Argued on 2025-03-25.

For petitioners in 23-1067: Mithun Mansinghani, Oklahoma City, Okla. For petitioners in 23-1068: Misha Tseytlin, Chicago, Ill. For respondents: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. VIDED.

Question Presented:

Under the Clean Air Act, each state must adopt an implementation plan to meet national standards, which EPA then reviews for compliance with the Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410. In 2023, EPA published disapprovals of 21 states' plans implementing national ozone standards. It did so in a single Federal Register notice. The Act specifies that "[a] petition for review of the [EPA's] action in approving or promulgating any implementation plan ... or any other final action of the [EPA] under this Act ... which is locally or regionally applicable may be filed only in" the appropriate regional circuit, while "nationally applicable regulations ... may be filed only in" the D.C. Circuit. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1). Parties from a dozen states sought judicial review of their respective state plan disapprovals in their appropriate regional circuits. The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits held that the implementation plan disapprovals of states within those circuits are appropriately challenged in their respective regional courts of appeals. In the decision below, the Tenth Circuit held that challenges to the disapprovals of Oklahoma's and Utah's plans can only be brought in the D.C. Circuit, explicitly disagreeing with the decisions of its sister circuits. The question presented is: Whether a final action by EPA taken pursuant to its Clean Air Act authority with respect to a single state or region may be challenged only in the D.C. Circuit because EPA published the action in the same Federal Register notice as actions affecting other states or regions and claimed to use a consistent analysis for all states

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

• Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

• Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:07) ORAL ARGUMENT OF MITHUN MANSINGHANI

(00:16:28) ORAL ARGUMENT OF MISHA TSEYTLIN.

(00:29:47) ORAL ARGUMENT OF MALCOLM L. STEWART

(00:29:49) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF MITHUN MANSINGHANI

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• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

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Argued on 2025-04-28.

For petitioner: Roman Martinez, Washington, D. C.; and Nicole F. Reaves, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For respondents: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D. C.

Question Presented:

Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Rehabilitation Act) require public entities and organizations that receive federal funding to provide reasonable accommodations for people with disabilities. In the decision below, the Eighth Circuit held that, for discrimination claims "based on educational services" brought by children with disabilities, these statutes are violated only if school officials acted with ''bad faith or gross misjudgment." App.3a. That test squarely implicates an entrenched and acknowledged 5-2 circuit split over the standard governing such claims. It is also plainly mistaken on the merits: As the Eighth Circuit itself acknowledged, the test lacks "any anchor in statutory text," App.5a n.2, and it arbitrarily departs from the more lenient standards that all courts-including the Eighth Circuit-apply to ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims brought by plaintiffs outside the school setting. The question presented is: Whether the ADA and Rehabilitation Act require children with disabilities to satisfy a uniquely stringent "bad faith or gross misjudgment" standard when seeking relief for discrimination relating to their education.

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

• Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

• Merits Stage Brief of the United States (Green Br.)

• Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:06) ORAL ARGUMENT OF ROMAN MARTINEZ

(00:23:04) ORAL ARGUMENT OF NICOLE F. REAVES

(00:45:18) ORAL ARGUMENT OF LISA S. BLATT

(01:22:40) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF ROMAN MARTINEZ

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• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

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Argued on 2025-04-01.

For petitioners in 24-20: Kent A. Yalowitz, New York, N. Y. For petitioner in 24-151: Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. For respondents: Mitchell R. Berger, Washington, D. C. VIDED.

Question Presented:

The Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA), 18 U.S.C. § 2331 et seq ., provides an extraterritorial private right of action for victims of terror attacks committed against American nationals abroad. In 2019, Congress amended the ATA by enacting the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act (PSJVTA). Under the PSJVTA, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Palestinian Authority (PA) "shall be deemed to have consented to personal jurisdiction" in an ATA action if: (a) more than 120 days after the statute's enactment, they pay any terrorist convicted of or killed while committing a terror attack against an American national, and the payment is made "by reason of' the conviction or terror attack, 18 U.S.C. § 2334(e) (1)(A); or (b) more than 15 days after the statute's enactment, they "conduct any activity" while physically present in the United States (with limited exceptions), id . § 2334(e)(1) (B). The PLO and PA engaged in both categories of conduct after the trigger dates. But in the decisions below, the Second Circuit facially invalidated the PSJVTA. The court held that the Fifth Amendment forbids Congress from specifying conduct that triggers a defendant's consent to federal jurisdiction unless the statute provides the defendant with some "governmental benefit" in return, and that the PLO and PA had not received such a benefit. The question presented is: Whether the PSJVTA violates the Fifth Amendment.

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

• Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

• Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:07) ORAL ARGUMENT OF KENT A. YALOWITZ

(00:36:17) ORAL ARGUMENT OF EDWIN S. KNEEDLER

(01:19:16) ORAL ARGUMENT OF MITCHELL R. BERGER

(01:49:59) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF EDWIN S. KNEEDLER

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

• Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

• Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Argued on 2025-04-29.

For petitioner: Noel J. Francisco, Washington, D. C. For United States, as amicus curiae: Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. For respondents: Deepak Gupta, Washington, D. C.

Question Presented:

Whether a federal court may certify a class action when some of its members lack any Article III injury.

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

• Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

• Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:07) ORAL ARGUMENT OF NOEL J. FRANCISCO

(01:09:24) ORAL ARGUMENT OF SOPAN JOSHI

(01:36:32) ORAL ARGUMENT OF DEEPAK GUPTA

(02:12:07) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF NOEL J. FRANCISCO

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• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

• Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Argued on 2024-12-11.

For petitioner: Thomas G. Hungar, Washington, D. C. For United States, as amicus curiae: Nicholas S. Crown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. For respondent: Elbert Lin, Richmond, Va.

Question Presented:

Whether an award of the "defendant's profits" under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (a), can include an order for the defendant to disgorge the distinct profits of legally separate non-party corporate affiliates.

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

• Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

• Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:05) ORAL ARGUMENT OF THOMAS G. HUNGAR

(00:28:13) ORAL ARGUMENT OF NICHOLAS S. CROWN FOR THE UNITED

(00:43:34) ORAL ARGUMENT OF ELBERT LIN

(01:06:40) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF THOMAS G. HUNGAR

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

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• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

• Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Argued on 2025-01-22.

For petitioners: Xiao Wang, Charlottesville, Va.; and Yaira Dubin, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For respondents: Nicole A. Saharsky, Washington, D. C.

Question Presented:

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1) (C), prohibits a plan fiduciary from "engag[ing] in a transaction, if he knows or should know that such transaction constitutes a direct or indirect furnishing of goods, services, or facilities between the plan and a party in interest." The statute elsewhere defines "party in interest" broadly to include a variety of parties that may contract with or provide services to a plan. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14)(B). The Eighth and Ninth Circuits have applied the Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have, on the other hand, required plaintiffs to allege additional elements to state a claim, because a "literal reading" of 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(C) would purportedly produce "results that are inconsistent with ERISA's statutory purpose." Albert v. Oshkosh Corp. , 47 F.4th 570, 585 (7th Cir. 2022). The question presented is: Whether a plaintiff can state a claim by alleging that a plan fiduciary engaged in a transaction constituting a furnishing of goods, services, or facilities between the plan and a party in interest, as proscribed by 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(C), or whether a plaintiff must plead and prove additional elements and facts not contained in the provision's text.

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

• Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

• Merits Stage Brief of the United States (Green Br.)

• Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:06) ORAL ARGUMENT OF XIAO WANG

(00:31:16) ORAL ARGUMENT OF YAIRA DUBIN

(00:57:33) ORAL ARGUMENT OF NICOLE A. SAHARSKY

(01:27:38) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF XIAO WANG

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• Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

• Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Argued on Mar 24 2025.

For appellant in 24-109: J. Benjamin Aguiñaga, Solicitor General, Baton Rouge, La. For appellants in 24-110: Stuart C. Naifeh, New York, N. Y. For appellees: Edward D. Greim, Kansas City, Mo. VIDED.

Question Presented:

Over the State's strenuous objections, the Middle District of Louisiana held, Robinson v. Ardoin , 605 F. Supp. 3d 759 (M.D. La. 2022)-and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, Robinson v. Ardoin , 86 F.4th 574 (5th Cir. 2023)-that Louisiana likely violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) by failing to create a second majority-Black congressional district. The Fifth Circuit gave the Legislature a small window of time to adopt its own remedial plan, or else the State would have to go to trial, which would almost certainly end in the Middle District imposing its own preferred map. Rather than acquiesce in the Middle District's preferences, the Legislature reclaimed its sovereign redistricting pen and passed S.B. 8, which created a second majority-Black district as the courts demanded, protected the Legislature's sovereign prerogatives, and achieved its political goals. In this case, a majority of a three-judge court sitting in the Western District of Louisiana enjoined S.B. 8 as an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. The questions presented are: 1. Did the majority err in finding that race predominated in the Legislature's enactment of S.B. 8? 2. Did the majority err in finding that S.B. 8 fails strict scrutiny? 3. Did the majority err in subjecting S.B. 8 to the Gingles preconditions? 4. Is this action non-justiciable? LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 3:24-cv-00122-DCJ-CES-RRS JURISDICTION NOTED 11/4/

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

• Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

• Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:07) ORAL ARGUMENT OF J. BENJAMIN AGUIÑAGA

(00:20:56) ORAL ARGUMENT OF STUART C. NAIFEH

(00:50:41) ORAL ARGUMENT OF EDWARD D. GREIM

(01:17:23) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF J. BENJAMIN.

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• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

• Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Argued on 2025-03-31.

For petitioners: Eric C. Rassbach, Washington, D. C.; and Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For respondents: Colin T. Roth, Assistant Attorney General, Madison, Wis.

Question Presented:

Wisconsin exempts from its state unemployment tax system certain religious organizations that are "operated, supervised, controlled, or principally supported by a church or convention or association of churches" and that are also "operated primarily for religious purposes." Petitioners are Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Superior and several sub-entities. Although all agree Catholic Charities is controlled by a church-the Diocese of Superior-the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that Catholic Charities is not "operated primarily for religious purposes" and thus does not qualify for the tax exemption. Specifically, the court held that Catholic Charities' activities are not "typical" religious activities because Catholic Charities serves and employs non-Catholics, Catholic Charities does not "attempt to imbue program participants with the Catholic faith," and its services to the poor and needy could also be provided by secular organizations. The questions presented are: 1. Does a state violate the First Amendment's Religion Clauses by denying a religious organization an otherwise-available tax exemption because the organization does not meet the state's criteria for religious behavior? 2. In addressing federal constitutional challenges, may state courts require proof of unconstitutionality "beyond a reasonable doubt?"

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

• Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

• Merits Stage Brief of the United States (Green Br.)

• Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:07) ORAL ARGUMENT OF ERIC C. RASSBACH

(00:37:47) ORAL ARGUMENT OF CURTIS E. GANNON

(01:00:38) ORAL ARGUMENT OF COLIN T. ROTH

(01:37:09) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF ERIC C. RASSBACH

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• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

• Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Argued on 2024-12-04.

For petitioner: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. For respondents L.W., et al. supporting petitioner: Chase B. Strangio, New York, N. Y. For respondents Jonathan Skrmetti, et al.: J. Matthew Rice, Solicitor General, Nashville, Tenn.

Question Presented:

Whether Tennessee Senate Bill 1 (SBl), which prohibits all medical treatments intended to allow "a minor to identify with, or live as, a purported identity inconsistent with the minor's sex" or to treat "purported discomfort or distress from a discordance between the minor's sex and asserted identity," Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-103(a)(1), violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

• Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

• Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:06) ORAL ARGUMENT OF GEN. ELIZABETH B. PRELOGAR

(01:04:47) ORAL ARGUMENT OF CHASE B. STRANGIO

(01:45:22) ORAL ARGUMENT OF J. MATTHEW RICE

(02:18:18) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF GEN. ELIZABETH B. PRELOGAR

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• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

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Argued on 2024-12-10.

For petitioners: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va. For federal respondents supporting petitioners: Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. For respondents Eagle County, et al.: William M. Jay, Washington, D. C.

Question Presented:

In Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen , 541 U.S. 752, 770 (2004), this Court held that when an agency cannot prevent an environmental effect "due to its limited statutory authority over the relevant actions," the National Environmental Policy Act does not require it to study that effect. This holding has divided the courts of appeals. Five circuits read Public Citizen to mean that an agency's environmental review can stop where its regulatory authority stops. Two circuits disagree and require review of any impact that can be called reasonably foreseeable. Here, the Surface Transportation Board relied on Public Citizen to cabin its environmental review of a new rail line in Utah. But the D.C. Circuit rejected that approach, ruling that the Board "cannot avoid" environmental review "on the ground that it lacks authority to prevent, control, or mitigate" distant environmental effects. As a result, it ordered the Board to study the local effects of oil wells and refineries that lie outside the Board's regulatory authority. The question presented is: Whether the National Environmental Policy Act requires an agency to study environmental impacts beyond the proximate effects of the action over which the agency has regulatory authority.

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

• Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

• Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:08) ORAL ARGUMENT OF PAUL D. CLEMENT

(00:42:19) ORAL ARGUMENT OF EDWIN S. KNEEDLER

(01:13:17) ORAL ARGUMENT OF WILLIAM M. JAY

(01:47:25) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF PAUL D. CLEMENT

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

• Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

• Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Argued on 2025-04-21.

For petitioner: Amanda Rice, Detroit, Mich. For respondent in support of petitioner: Aimee Brown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. For Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of judgment below: Michael R. Huston, Phoenix, Ariz.

Question Presented:

Ordinarily, litigants must file a notice of appeal within 30 or 60 days of an adverse judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a)-(b). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c) and Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6), however, district courts can reopen an expired appeal period when a party did not receive timely notice of the judgment. The Courts of Appeals have divided about whether a notice of appeal filed after the expiration of the ordinary appeal period but before the appeal period is reopened becomes effective once reopening is granted. The Question Presented is whether a litigant who files a notice of appeal after the ordinary appeal period expires must file a second, duplicative notice after the appeal period is reopened

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

• Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

• Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:07) ORAL ARGUMENT OF AMANDA RICE

(00:14:53) ORAL ARGUMENT OF AIMEE BROWN

(00:28:44) ORAL ARGUMENT OF MICHAEL R. HUSTON

(00:52:14) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF AMANDA RICE

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

• Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

• Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Argued on 2024-11-06.

For petitioners: Kannon K. Shanmugam, Washington, D. C. For respondents: Kevin K. Russell, Washington, D. C.; and Kevin J. Barber, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)

Question Presented:

This petition presents two important questions that have divided the federal courts of appeals. First , the circuits have split three ways concerning what public companies must disclose in the "risk factors" section of their 10-K filings. The Sixth Circuit holds that companies need not disclose past instances when a risk has materialized. The First, Second, Third, Fifth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits hold that companies must disclose that a risk materialized in the past if the company knows that event will harm the business. The Ninth Circuit here adopted a third, outlier position requiring companies to disclose that a risk materialized in the past even if there is no known threat of business harm. Second , the circuits disagree on the proper pleading standard for the loss causation element of a private securities-fraud claim. The Fourth Circuit holds that loss causation allegations must satisfy Federal Rule 9(b)'s heightened pleading standard for fraud, while the Fifth and Sixth Circuits apply the ordinary Rule 8 standard. The Ninth Circuit here initially applied Rule 8, then substituted citations of Rule 9(b) without changing its analysis. The questions presented are: 1. Are risk disclosures false or misleading when they do not disclose that a risk has materialized in the past, even if that past event presents no known risk of ongoing or future business harm? 2. Does Federal Rule 8 or Rule 9(b) supply the proper pleading standard for loss causation in a private securities-fraud action?

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

• Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

• Merits Stage Brief of the United States (Green Br.)

• Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:04) ORAL ARGUMENT OF KANNON K. SHANMUGAM

(00:46:42) ORAL ARGUMENT OF KEVIN K. RUSSELL

(01:13:16) ORAL ARGUMENT OF KEVIN J. BARBER

(01:38:49) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF KANNON K. SHANMUGAM

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

• Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

• Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Argued on 2025-05-15.

For applicants: D. John Sauer, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. For state and city respondents: Jeremy M. Feigenbaum, Solicitor General, Trenton, N. J. For private respondents: Kelsi B. Corkran, Washington, D. C. VIDED.

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:06) ORAL ARGUMENT OF GEN. D. JOHN SAUER

(01:03:15) ORAL ARGUMENT OF JEREMY M. FEIGENBAUM

(01:43:34) ORAL ARGUMENT OF KELSI B. CORKRAN

(02:13:33) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF GEN. D. JOHN SAUER

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• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

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Argued on Dec 03 2024.

For petitioners: Joshua S. Glasgow, Buffalo, N. Y.; and Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For respondents: Shay Dvoretzky, Washington, D. C.

Question Presented:

A foreign sovereign is generally immune from suit in domestic courts, subject to the specific exceptions of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Under the expropriation exception, claims involving rights in property taken in violation of international law may be heard if "property or any property exchanged for such property" has a commercial nexus with the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3). Specifically, the property or its proceeds must be either "present in the United States in connection with a commercial activity" or "owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state and that agency or instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activity in the United States." Id . The circuit courts have split as to the showing required to meet the commercial nexus requirement. The Questions Presented are: (1) Whether historical commingling of assets suffices to establish that proceeds of seized property have a commercial nexus with the United States under the expropriation exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. (2) Whether a plaintiff must make out a valid claim that an exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act applies at the pleading stage, rather than merely raising a plausible inference. (3) Whether a sovereign defendant bears the burden of producing evidence to affirmatively disprove that the proceeds of property taken in violation of international law have a commercial nexus with the United States under the expropriation exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

• Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

• Merits Stage Brief of the United States (Green Br.)

• Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:06) ORAL ARGUMENT OF JOSHUA S. GLASGOW

(00:24:00) ORAL ARGUMENT OF SOPAN JOSHI

(00:50:53) ORAL ARGUMENT OF SHAY DVORETZKY

(01:21:43) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF JOSHUA S. GLASGOW

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• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

• Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Argued on 2025-03-26.

For petitioners in 24-354: Sarah M. Harris, Acting Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. For petitioners in 24-422: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va. For respondents: R. Trent McCotter, Washington, D. C. VIDED.

Question Presented:

BY THE PETITIONS, THE PARTIES ARE DIRECTED TO BRIEF AND ARGUE THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER THIS CASE IS MOOT IN LIGHT OF THE CHALLENGERS' FAILURE TO SEEK PRELIMINARY RELIEF BEFORE THE FIFTH CIRCUIT. CERT. GRANTED 11/22/2024 QUESTION PRESENTED: In 47 U.S.C. 254, Congress required the Federal Communications Commission (Commission) to operate universal service subsidy programs using mandatory contributions from telecommunications carriers. The Commission has appointed a private company as the programs' Administrator, authorizing that company to perform administrative tasks such as sending out bills, collecting contributions, and disbursing funds to beneficiaries. The questions presented are as follows: 1. Whether Congress violated the nondelegation doctrine by authorizing the Commission to determine, within the limits set forth in Section 254, the amount that providers must contribute to the Fund. 2. Whether the Commission violated the nondelegation doctrine by using the Administrator's financial projections in computing universal service contribution rates. 3. Whether the combination of Congress's conferral of authority on the Commission and the Commission's delegation of administrative responsibilities to the Administrator violates the nondelegation doctrine.

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

• Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

• Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:07) ORAL ARGUMENT OF SARAH M. HARRIS

(00:56:10) ORAL ARGUMENT OF PAUL D. CLEMENT

(01:32:06) ORAL ARGUMENT OF R. TRENT McCOTTER

(02:30:10) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF SARAH M. HARRIS

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• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

• Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Argued on 2024-11-13.

For petitioners: Neal K. Katyal, Washington, D. C. For respondents: Deepak Gupta, Washington, D. C.; and Colleen R. Sinzdak, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)

Question Presented:

The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) imposes "[e]xacting pleading requirements" on plaintiffs who file securities fraud class actions. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd ., 551 U.S. 311, 313 (2007). To state a claim, plaintiffs must "state with particularity all facts" supporting their allegations of falsity and must also allege "facts giving rise to a strong inference" of the required mental state. 15 U.S.C § 78u-4(b)(1), (2)(A); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Plaintiffs frequently try to meet these requirements by claiming that internal company documents contradicted the company's public statements. This petition presents two questions that have divided the circuits about how the PSLRA's requirements apply in this common and recurring context: 1. Whether plaintiffs seeking to allege scienter under the PSLRA based on allegations about internal company documents must plead with particularity the contents of those documents. 2. Whether plaintiffs can satisfy the PSLRA's falsity requirement by relying on an expert opinion to substitute for particularized allegations of fact.

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

• Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

• Merits Stage Brief of the United States (Green Br.)

• Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:06) ORAL ARGUMENT OF NEAL K. KATYAL

(00:41:53) ORAL ARGUMENT OF DEEPAK GUPTA

(01:12:45) ORAL ARGUMENT OF COLLEEN R. SINZDAK

(01:21:56) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF NEAL K. KATYAL

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• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

• Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Argued on 2025-04-22.

For petitioners: Eric S. Baxter, Washington, D. C.; and Sarah M. Harris, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For respondents: Alan E. Schoenfeld, New York, N. Y.

Question Presented:

Respondent Montgomery County Board of Education requires elementary school teachers to read their students storybooks celebrating gender transitions, Pride parades, and same-sex playground romance. The storybooks were chosen to disrupt "cisnormativity" and "either/or thinking" among students. The Board's own principals objected that the curriculum was "not appropriate for the intended age group," presented gender ideology as "fact," "sham[ed]" students with contrary opinions, and was "dismissive of religious beliefs." The Board initially allowed parents to opt their kids out- but then reversed course, saying that no opt-outs would be permitted and that parents would not even be notified when the storybooks were read. Petitioners filed suit, not challenging the curriculum, but arguing that compelling their elementary-age children to participate in instruction contrary to their parents' religious convictions violated the Free Exercise Clause. Construing Wisconsin v. Yoder , the Fourth Circuit found no free-exercise burden because no one was forced "to change their religious beliefs or conduct." The question presented is: Do public schools burden parents' religious exercise when they compel elementary school children to participate in instruction on gender and sexuality against their parents' religious convictions and with-out notice or opportunity to opt out?

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

• Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

• Merits Stage Brief of the United States (Green Br.)

• Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:06) ORAL ARGUMENT OF ERIC S. BAXTER

(00:53:42) ORAL ARGUMENT OF SARAH M. HARRIS

(01:22:15) ORAL ARGUMENT OF ALAN E. SCHOENFELD

(02:25:58) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF ERIC S. BAXTER

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• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

• Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Argued on 2024-02-21.

For petitioners: Kannon K. Shanmugam, Washington, D. C. For respondents: Joe Wesley Earnhardt, New York, N. Y.; and Yaira Dubin, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)

Question Presented:

Whether the Copyright Act's statute of limitations for civil actions, 17 U.S.C. 507(b), precludes retrospective relief for acts that occurred more than three years before the filing of a lawsuit.

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

• Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

• Merits Stage Brief of the United States (Green Br.)

• Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:06) ORAL ARGUMENT OF KANNON K. SHANMUGAM

(00:25:29) ORAL ARGUMENT OF JOE WESLEY EARNHARDT

(00:43:15) ORAL ARGUMENT OF YAIRA DUBIN

(00:48:47) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF KANNON K. SHANMUGAM

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

• Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

• Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Argued on 2023-10-11.

For appellants: John M. Gore, Washington, D. C. For appellees: Leah C. Aden, New York, N. Y. For United States, as amicus curiae: Caroline A. Flynn, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.

Question Presented:

The three-judge district court never mentioned the presumption of the South Carolina General Assembly's good faith, analyzed Congressional District 1 as a whole, or examined the intent of the General Assembly as a whole. It also disregarded the publicly available election data used to draw District 1 and legislator testimony demonstrating that politics and traditional districting principles better explain District 1 than race. And it never identified an alternative map that achieved the General Assembly's political objectives while similarly adhering to traditional criteria. The court nonetheless held that a portion of District 1 is racially gerrymandered and discriminatory, and therefore permanently enjoined elections there. After an eight- day trial featuring more than twenty witnesses and hundreds of exhibits, the court rested this holding on its brief questioning of the experienced nonpartisan map drawer and its conclusion that he used a racial target as a proxy for politics in District 1. Plaintiffs did not pursue that theory at trial, and the court never explained why the General Assembly would use race as a proxy to draw lines for political reasons when it could (and did) use election data directly to do the job. The questions presented are: 1. Did the district court err when it failed to apply the presumption of good faith and to holistically analyze District 1 and the General Assembly's intent? 2. Did the district court err in failing to enforce the alternative-map requirement m this circumstantial case? 3. Did the district court err when it failed to disentangle race from politics? 4. Did the district court err in finding racial predominance when it never analyzed District l's compliance with traditional districting principles? 5. Did the district court clearly err in finding that the General Assembly used a racial target as a proxy for politics when the record showed only that the General Assembly was aware of race, that race and politics are highly correlated, and that the General Assembly drew districts based on election data? 6. Did the district court err in upholding the intentional discrimination claim when it never even considered whether-let alone found that-District 1 has a discriminatory effect?

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

• Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

• Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:08) ORAL ARGUMENT OF JOHN M. GORE

(00:49:27) ORAL ARGUMENT OF LEAH C. ADEN

(01:31:06) ORAL ARGUMENT OF CAROLINE A. FLYNN

(01:59:48) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF JOHN M. GORE

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

• Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

• Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Argued on 2024-02-08.

For petitioner: Jonathan F. Mitchell, Austin, Tex. For respondents Anderson, et al.: Jason C. Murray, Denver, Colo. For respondent Griswold: Shannon W. Stevenson, Solicitor General, Denver, Colo.

Question Presented:

The Supreme Court of Colorado held that President Donald J. Trump is disqualified from holding the office of President because he "engaged in insurrection" against the Constitution of the United States-and that he did so after taking an oath "as an officer of the United States" to "support" the Constitution. The state supreme court ruled that the Colorado Secretary of State should not list President Trump's name on the 2024 presidential primary ballot or count any write-in votes cast for him. The state supreme court stayed its decision pending United States Supreme Court review. The question presented is: Did the Colorado Supreme Court err in ordering President Trump excluded from the 2024 presidential primary ballot?

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

• Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

• Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:05) ORAL ARGUMENT OF JONATHAN F. MITCHELL

(00:53:39) ORAL ARGUMENT OF JASON C. MURRAY

(01:53:02) ORAL ARGUMENT OF SHANNON W. STEVENSON

(02:05:54) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF JONATHAN F. MITCHELL

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• Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

• Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Argued on 2024-03-20.

For United States: Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. For Texas: Lanora C. Pettit, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Austin, Tex. For New Mexico: Jeffrey J. Wechsler, Santa Fe, N. M.

Question Presented:

EXCEPTION OF THE UNITED STATE TO THE THIRD INTERIM REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER: The United States excepts to the Special Master ’ s recommendation that the States ’ joint motion to enter a consent decree be granted.

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Intervener United States's Exceptions and Opening Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Reply Brief to Exceptions of Texas, New Mexico, and Colorado (Yellow Br.)

• Sur-Reply Brief of Intervener United States (Tan Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:06) ORAL ARGUMENT OF FREDERICK LIU

(00:32:30) ORAL ARGUMENT OF LANORA C. PETTIT

(00:56:03) ORAL ARGUMENT OF JEFFREY J. WECHSLER

(01:04:47) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF FREDERICK LIU

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• Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

• Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Argued on 2024-02-27.

For petitioners: Jonathan E. Taylor, Washington, D. C.; and Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For respondent: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D. C.

Question Presented:

At least thirteen states have, enacted laws requiring mortgage lenders to pay a minimum interest rate on funds held in mortgage escrow accounts. Congress has since recognized the existence of these state escrow-interest laws and has expressly required national banks to comply with them where applicable. See 15 U.S.C. § 1639d(g)(3). The question presented is: Does the National Bank Act preempt the application of state escrow-interest laws to national banks?

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

• Cert. Stage Brief of the United States (Green Br.)

• Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

• Merits Stage Brief of the United States (Green Br.)

• Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:05) ORAL ARGUMENT OF JONATHAN E. TAYLOR

(00:36:17) ORAL ARGUMENT OF MALCOLM L. STEWART

(01:01:46) ORAL ARGUMENT OF LISA S. BLATT

(01:44:36) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF JONATHAN E. TAYLOR

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• Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

• Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Argued on 2024-01-09.

For petitioner: Paul J. Beard, II, Los Angeles, Cal. For respondent: Aileen M. McGrath, San Francisco, Cal.; and Erica L. Ross, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)

Question Presented:

George Sheetz applied, to the County of El Dorado, California, for a permit to build a modest manufactured house on his property. Pursuant to legislation enacted by the County, and as the condition of obtaining the permit, Mr. Sheetz was required to pay a monetary exaction of $23,420 to help finance unrelated road improvements. The County demanded payment in spite of the fact that it made no individualized determination that the exaction-a substantial sum for Mr. Sheetz-bore an "essential nexus" and "rough proportionality" to the purported impacts associated with his modest project as required in Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n , 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) and Dolan v. City of Tigard , 512 U.S. 37 4, 391 (1994). Mr. Sheetz challenged the exaction as an unconstitutional condition under Nollan and Dolan . A California trial court upheld the exaction, holding that, because it was authorized by legislation, the exaction was immune from Nollan/Dolan review. In a published decision, the California Court of Appeal affirmed, and the California Supreme Court denied review. California's judicially-created exemption from Nollan/Dolan scrutiny for legislative exactions conflicts with the decisions of other federal and state courts across the country, and is in strong tension with this Court's more recent precedents. The question presented is whether a permit exaction is exempt from the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine as applied in Nollan and Dolan simply because it is authorized by legislation.

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

• Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

• Merits Stage Brief of the United States (Green Br.)

• Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:05) ORAL ARGUMENT OF PAUL J. BEARD, II

(00:44:10) ORAL ARGUMENT OF AILEEN M. McGRATH

(01:14:00) ORAL ARGUMENT OF ERICA L. ROSS

(01:25:50) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF PAUL J. BEARD, II

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

• Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

• Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Argued on 2024-02-26.

For petitioners: Henry C. Whitaker, Solicitor General, Tallahassee, Fla. For respondents: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va.; and Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)

Question Presented:

Florida has enacted a law that attempts to prevent social-media companies from abusing their enormous power to censor speech. The questions presented are: 1. Whether the First Amendment prohibits a State from requiring that social-media companies host third-party communications, and from regulating the time, place, and manner in which they do so. 2. Whether the First Amendment prohibits a State from requiring social-media companies to notify and provide an explanation to their users when they censor the user's speech. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 21-12355 The petitions for writs of certiorari are granted limited to Questions 1 and 2 presented by the Solicitor General in her brief for the United States as amicus curie . 1. Whether the laws ’ content-moderation restrictions comply with the First Amendment. 2. Whether the laws ’ individualized-explanation requirements comply with the First Amendment. CERT. GRANTED 9/29/

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

• Cert. Stage Brief of the United States (Green Br.)

• Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

• Merits Stage Brief of the United States (Green Br.)

• Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Respondent's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:06) ORAL ARGUMENT OF HENRY C. WHITAKER

(00:55:06) ORAL ARGUMENT OF PAUL D. CLEMENT

(01:42:39) ORAL ARGUMENT OF GEN. ELIZABETH B. PRELOGAR

(02:19:47) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF HENRY C. WHITAKER

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• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

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Argued on 2025-01-10.

For petitioners TikTok Inc., et al.: Noel J. Francisco, Washington, D. C. For petitioners Firebaugh, et al.: Jeffrey L. Fisher, Melo Park, Cal. For respondent: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. VIDED.

Question Presented:

THE PARTIES ARE DIRECTED TO BRIEF AND ARGUE THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER THE PROTECTING AMERICANS FROM FOREIGN ADVERSARY CONTROLLED APPLICATIONS ACT, AS APPLIED TO PETITIONERS, VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT.

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

• Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

• Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Respondent's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:05) ORAL ARGUMENT OF NOEL J. FRANCISCO

(00:59:26) ORAL ARGUMENT OF JEFFREY L. FISHER

(01:34:35) ORAL ARGUMENT OF GEN. ELIZABETH B. PRELOGAR

(02:23:33) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF NOEL J. FRANCISCO

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

• Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

• Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Argued on 2024-10-09.

For petitioner: Seth P. Waxman, Washington, D. C. For respondent in support of petitioner: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va. For Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of judgment below: Christopher G. Michel, Washington, D. C.

Question Presented:

Justin Sneed was, in the State's words, its "indispensable witness," and Richard Glossip's "fate turned on Sneed's credibility." Sneed is the person who "bludgeoned the victim to death, and his testimony linking Glossip to the murder was central to the conviction." State Stay Resp. 10, Glossip v. Oklahoma , No. 22A941 (U.S.). He only claimed Mr. Glossip was involved after being fed Mr. Glossip's name six times and threatened with execution. And his accounting of basic facts about the crime has shifted dramatically with each telling. With Sneed's credibility already tenuous, the State undisputedly hid from the jury Sneed's having "seen a psychiatrist" who diagnosed Sneed with a psychiatric condition that rendered him volatile and "potentially violent," particularly when combined with methamphetamine use, a street drug Sneed was abusing at the time he murdered Barry Van Treese. Id . In fact, the State allowed Sneed to affirmatively tell the jury he had not seen a psychiatrist. Before the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA), the State confessed error, admitting that the failure to disclose the truth about Sneed's psychiatric condition, leaving the jury with Sneed's uncorrected false testimony and then suppressing this information for a quarter-century, rendered "Glossip's trial unfair and unreliable." Id . at 4-5. Before this Court, the State has admitted Mr. Glossip is entitled to a new trial on these grounds, as well as in light of "cumulative error" regarding "multiple issues raised in Glossip's Post-Conviction Relief Application." Id . at 4. But the OCCA has refused to stop the execution of an innocent man who never had a fair trial. This petition presents the following questions: 1. a. Whether the State's suppression of the key prosecution witness's admission he was under the care of a psychiatrist and failure to correct that witness's false testimony about that care and related diagnosis violate the due process of law. See Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Napue v. Illinois , 360 U.S. 264 (1959). b. Whether the entirety of the suppressed evidence must be considered when assessing the materiality of Brady and Napue claims. See Kyles v. Whitley , 514 U.S. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: PCD-2023-267 IN ADDITION TO THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED, THE PARTIES ARE DIRECTED TO BRIEF AND ARGUE THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER THE OKLAHOMA COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS' HOLDING THAT THE OKLAHOMA POST- CONVICTION PROCEDURE ACT PRECLUDED POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IS AN ADEQUATE AND INDEPENDENT STATE-LAW GROUND FOR THE JUDGMENT. JUSTICE GORSUCH TOOK NO PART. ORDER OF JANUARY 26, 2024: CHRISTOPHER G. MICHEL, ESQUIRE, OF WASHINGTON, D. C., IS INVITED TO BRIEF AND ARGUE THIS CASE, AS AMICUS CURIAE, IN SUPPORT OF THE JUDGMENT BELOW. JUSTICE GORSUCH TOOK NO PART. CERT. GRANTED 1/22/2024 419 (1995). 2. Whether due process of law requires reversal, where a capital conviction is so infected with errors that the State no longer seeks to defend it. See Escobar v. Texas , 143 S. Ct. 557 (2023) (mem.).

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

• Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

• Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:06) ORAL ARGUMENT OF SETH P. WAXMAN

(00:32:13) ORAL ARGUMENT OF PAUL D. CLEMENT ON BEHALF OF THE

(01:06:37) ORAL ARGUMENT OF CHRISTOPHER G. MICHEL,

(01:39:29) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF SETH P. WAXMAN

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

• Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

• Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Argued on 2023-10-30.

For petitioners: Shay Dvoretzky, Washington, D. C. For respondents: Edmund G. LaCour, Jr., Solicitor General, Montgomery, Ala.; and Nicole F. Reaves, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)

Question Presented:

In determining whether the Due Process Clause requires a state or local government to provide a post seizure probable cause hearing prior to a statutory judicial forfeiture proceeding and, if so, when such a hearing must take place, should district courts apply the "speedy trial" test employed in United States v. $8,850 , 461 U.S. 555 (1983) and Barker v. Wingo , 407 U.S. 514 (1972), as held by the Eleventh Circuit or the three-part due process analysis set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319 (1976) as held by at least the Second, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits.

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

• Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

• Merits Stage Brief of the United States (Green Br.)

• Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:06) ORAL ARGUMENT OF SHAY DVORETZKY

(00:49:55) ORAL ARGUMENT OF EDMUND G. LaCOUR, JR.

(01:21:23) ORAL ARGUMENT OF NICOLE F. REAVES

(01:34:32) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF SHAY DVORETZKY

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

• Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

• Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Argued on 2023-10-31.

For petitioner: Allon Kedem, Washington, D. C. For respondent: Victoria R. Ferres, Port Huron, Mich.; and Masha G. Hansford, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)

Question Presented:

Courts have increasingly been called upon to determine whether a public official who selectively blocks access to his or her social media account has engaged in state action subject to constitutional scrutiny. To answer that question, most circuits consider a broad range of factors, including the account's appearance and purpose. But in the decision below, the court of appeals rejected the relevance of any consideration other than whether the official was performing a "duty of his office" or invoking the "authority of his office." App. 5a. The question presented is: Whether a public official's social media activity can constitute state action only if the official used the account to perform a governmental duty or under the authority of his or her office.

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

• Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

• Merits Stage Brief of the United States (Green Br.)

• Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:06) ORAL ARGUMENT OF ALLON KEDEM

(00:27:37) ORAL ARGUMENT OF VICTORIA R. FERRES

(00:47:16) ORAL ARGUMENT OF MASHA G. HANSFORD

(01:12:04) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF ALLON KEDEM

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

• Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

• Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Argued on 2024-04-22.

For petitioner: Theane D. Evangelis, Los Angeles, Cal. For United States, as amicus curiae: Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. For respondents: Kelsi B. Corkran, Washington, D. C.

Question Presented:

In Martin v. City of Boise , 920 F.3d 584 (9th Cir. 2019), the Ninth Circuit held that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause prevents cities from enforcing criminal restrictions on public camping unless the person has "access to adequate temporary shelter." Id . at 617 & n.8. In this case, the Ninth Circuit extended Martin to a classwide injunction prohibiting the City of Grants Pass from enforcing its public-camping ordinance even though civil citations. That decision cemented a conflict with the California Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit, which have upheld similar ordinances, and entrenched a broader split on the application of the Eighth Amendment to purportedly involuntary conduct. The Ninth Circuit nevertheless denied rehearing en banc by a 14-to-13 vote. The question presented is: Does the enforcement of generally applicable laws regulating camping on public property constitute "cruel and unusual punishment" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment?

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

• Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

• Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:07) ORAL ARGUMENT OF THEANE D. EVANGELIS

(00:54:25) ORAL ARGUMENT OF EDWIN S. KNEEDLER

(01:48:43) ORAL ARGUMENT OF KELSI B. CORKRAN

(02:20:48) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF THEANE D. EVANGELIS

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

• Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

• Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Argued on 2023-12-04.

For petitioner: Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. For respondents Purdue Pharma L.P., et al.: Gregory G. Garre, Washington, D. C. For respondents The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Purdue Pharma L.P., et al.: Pratik A. Shah, Washington, D. C.

Question Presented:

Whether the Bankruptcy Code authorizes a court to approve, as part of a plan of reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, a release that extinguishes claims held by nondebtors against nondebtor third parties, without the claimants ’ consent.

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

• Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

• Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:08) ORAL ARGUMENT OF CURTIS E. GANNON

(00:48:44) ORAL ARGUMENT OF GREGORY G. GARRE

(01:16:50) ORAL ARGUMENT OF PRATIK A. SHAH

(01:39:49) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF CURTIS E. GANNON

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

• Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

• Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Argued on 2024-03-26.

For federal petitioners: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. For petitioner Danco Laboratories, L.L.C.: Jessica L. Ellsworth, Washington, D. C. For respondents: Erin M. Hawley, Washington, D. C. VIDED.

Question Presented:

This case concerns mifepristone, a drug that the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved in 2000 as safe and effective for terminating early pregnancies. The Fifth Circuit held that respondents-doctors and associations of doctors who oppose abortion-have Article III standing to challenge FDA's 2016 and 2021 actions with respect to mifepristone's approved conditions of use and that those actions were likely arbitrary and capricious. The court therefore affirmed the district court's stay of the relevant agency actions. The questions presented are: 1. Whether respondents have Article III standing to challenge FDA's 2016 and 2021 actions. 2. Whether FDA's 2016 and 2021 actions were arbitrary and capricious. 3. Whether the district court properly granted preliminary relief.

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

• Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

• Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:08) ORAL ARGUMENT OF GEN. ELIZABETH B. PRELOGAR

(00:37:12) ORAL ARGUMENT OF JESSICA L. ELLSWORTH

(00:50:13) ORAL ARGUMENT OF ERIN M. HAWLEY

(01:29:46) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF GEN. ELIZABETH B. PRELOGAR

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

• Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

• Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Argued on 2024-01-10.

For petitioner: Hari Santhanam, Chicago, Ill. For United States, as amicus curiae: Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. For respondent: Alexander W. Samuels, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Phoenix, Ariz.

Question Presented:

Whether the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment permits the prosecution in a criminal trial to present testimony by a substitute expert conveying the testimonial statements of a nontestifying forensic analyst, on the grounds that (a) the testifying expert offers some independent opinion and the analyst's statements are offered not for their truth but to explain the expert's opinion, and (b) the defendant did not independently seek to subpoena the analyst.

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

• Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

• Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:06) ORAL ARGUMENT OF HARI SANTHANAM

(00:25:32) ORAL ARGUMENT OF ERIC J. FEIGIN

(00:45:12) ORAL ARGUMENT OF ALEXANDER W. SAMUELS

(01:23:39) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF HARI SANTHANAM

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

• Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

• Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y